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The simple actions of everyday life—flicking a light switch,
suppressing the urge to say something, or grabbing a waiter’s
attention with a “check, please”—remain difficult to understand
from a scientific point of view. Unlike the mechanisms giving
rise to machine action—which are designed according to clear-
cut, well principled plans—the mechanisms underlying human
action are fashioned by the happenstance and tinkering process
of evolution, whose products can be counterintuitive and subop-
timal (Simpson, 1949; Lorenz, 1963; Gould, 1977; de Waal, 2002;
Marcus, 2008), far unlike the kinds of things we humans design
into robots (Arkin, 1998)1. When speaking about the reverse
engineering of biological products, the roboticist thus cautions,
“Biological systems bring a large amount of evolutionary baggage
unnecessary to support intelligent behavior in their silicon based
counterparts” (Arkin, 1998, p. 32), and, speaking of the products
of mother nature, the ethologist concludes, “To the biologist who
knows the ways in which selection works and who is also aware
of its limitations it is no way surprising to find, in its construc-
tions, some details which are unnecessary or even detrimental to
survival” (Lorenz, 1963, p. 260).
Faced with this and many other challenges (cf., Rosenbaum,
2005; Herwig et al., 2013), the student of human action is forced
to abandon a normative view (which describes how things should
function) of the phenomena at hand and adopt instead a more
humble, descriptive view (which describes the products of nature
as they have evolved to be). From such a descriptive approach,
investigators over the past two decades have begun to illuminate,
not only the basic processes underlying human action, but the
liaison between action and consciousness—the most mysterious
aspect of nervous function (Roach, 2005).
In this special issue of Frontiers in Cognition, we survey these
advances stemming from disparate fields of inquiry, includ-
ing cognition, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence/robotics.
Together, these developments unveil a great deal about the links
between perception and action while also illuminating much
about all else in between. Of note, these developments also
reveal that the study of action production and control (“action
control,” for short) provides a unique portal through which
to examine the nature of conscious processing. As explained
below, many aspects of consciousness are easier to study from
1Consider that the artificial heart is very different from its natural counterpart
and that the difference between human locomotion and artificial locomotion
is a stark one—that between legs versus wheels.
an action-based approach than from a perception-based perspec-
tive, which has been the traditional approach to studying con-
sciousness (e.g., Crick and Koch, 2003; see discussion in Baars,
1997).
Before discussing further the liaison between consciousness
and action control, and what the latter informs about the former,
it is important to first describe the most nebulous term at hand,
“consciousness.”
THE MIND-BOGGLING AND (UNFORTUNATELY)
INESCAPABLE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE BRAIN
Throughout intellectual history, people have been investigating
the phenomenon of consciousness in one way or another, though
often while avoiding utterance of the controversial term, “con-
sciousness,” which has been considered unscientific for most of its
history. During the Behaviorist era (1919–1948), in which discus-
sion of consciousness was strongly discouraged, the rank and file
psychophysicist and Gestalt psychologist continued to study the
“conscious field” that had been the object of investigation during
the earlier Structuralist era pioneered by Wundt and Titchener
(1879–1919). Since the fall of Behaviorism, a de facto distinction
has been made between conscious and unconscious processing in
every field of inquiry of psychology and neuroscience, though,
again, often without mention of the term “consciousness.” In per-
ception research, psychophysical measurement continues to make
the distinction of supra- vs. subliminal, and to base its conclusions
on conscious “self-report.” In the study of attention, the term
“attentional awareness” is often contrasted with unconscious,
“pre-attentive” processing (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). In mem-
ory research, there is the classic distinction between “declarative”
(explicit) processes and “procedural” (implicit) processes (Squire,
1987; Schacter, 1996). In research on motor control and on lan-
guage production, the conscious aspects of voluntary action and
action monitoring are contrasted with the unconscious aspects
of motor programming (Levelt, 1989; Rosenbaum, 2002), includ-
ing the implicit learning of motor sequences (Taylor and Ivry,
2013). Last, various fields contrast “controlled” processing, which
tends to be associated with consciousness, and “automatic” pro-
cessing, which tends to be associated with unconscious mecha-
nisms (e.g., Lieberman, 2007; but see Panagiotaropoulos et al.,
2013).
In summary, the difference between conscious and uncon-
scious processes (regardless of the appellations ascribed to each
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process) is an inescapable contrast that is encountered after even
a cursory examination of mental and nervous phenomena2.
Upon accepting that, in the natural world, there are con-
scious and unconscious processes, then onemust contemplate the
phenomenon of consciousness. Understanding how the nervous
system gives rise to basic, low-level consciousness—the subjec-
tive experience of pain, breathlessness, or a yellow afterimage—
remains one of the greatest puzzles in science (Crick, 1995; Roach,
2005). This most basic form of consciousness is referred to as
“sentience” (Pinker, 1997), “subjective experience,” “phenomenal
state,” and “qualia” (Gray, 2004). It has been best defined by Nagel
(1974), who proposed that an organism possesses consciousness
if there is something it is like to be that organism—something
it is like, for example, to be human and experience pain, yellow
afterimages, or breathlessness.
Some have attempted to explain away this mind-boggling
puzzle by claiming that consciousness does not exist (which is
perhaps the least deniable fact of our existence, given that con-
sciousness encompasses the totality of all we know) or that it
exists but serves no function (that is, it is “epiphenomenal”) in
the nervous system. Unfortunately, while the former view is dif-
ficult to defend, the latter view does not provide an escape from
the enigma at hand either. Regardless of whether consciousness
serves a function in the nervous system or not, the scientist must
still explain its place within nature: Huxley’s steam whistle may
be epiphenomenal with respect to the locomotive, but the sci-
entist must still understand what it is (high frequencies) and
how it arises from physical events (high pressured steam released
through a small aperture). It seems premature to state that a
phenomenon does not serve a function when the place of that
phenomenon within nature remains unknown. In short, even if a
phenomenon is functionless, a complete scientific account of the
natural world must include an explication of it. See, in this issue,
the article by Pereira et al. for a novel, untraditional approach to
consciousness; see also relevant articles by Cruse and Schilling, by
Hommel, and by Masicampo and Baumeister.
Progress regarding the puzzle of consciousness has stemmed
from descriptive approaches juxtaposing conscious and uncon-
scious processing in terms of their cognitive and neural correlates
(Shallice, 1972; Logothetis and Schall, 1989; Crick and Koch,
1995; Kinsbourne, 1996; Wegner and Bargh, 1998; Grossberg,
1999; Di Lollo et al., 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Baars, 2002, 2005; Gray, 2004; Libet, 2004; Laureys, 2005;
Morsella, 2005; Merker, 2007; Doesburg et al., 2009; Damasio,
2010; Boly et al., 2011; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). [For a
review regarding the conclusions of this contrast, see Godwin
et al. (2013); for discussion of the limitations of a contrastive
approach, see Aru et al. (2012).] To examine this contrast,
researchers have focused primarily on perceptual processing (see
Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2013), for several important reasons
2It is important to appreciate that, even in the early Twentieth Century, in the
field of psychiatry (which was at that time independent from psychophysics
and other forms of academic psychology), the student of the mind realized
that in the nervous system there are processes that are consciously mediated
and those that are unconsciously mediated, as discussed at length and with
great insight by the psychiatrist Bleuler (1924).
(see reasons in Crick and Koch, 2003). Perception-based research
has illuminated how entry into consciousness (“entry,” for short)
is influenced by processes that are “bottom-up” (e.g., stimulus
salience, motion, novelty, incentive and emotional quality, etc.;
Gazzaley and D’Esposito, 2007) or attentional (cf., Most et al.,
2005). This important research has led to several advances (see
review in Koch, 2004), including (a) the differences in the process-
ing of stimuli that are supraliminal (i.e., consciously-perceptible)
and subliminal (i.e., consciously-imperceptible; Logothetis and
Schall, 1989; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Koch, 2004; Roser and
Gazzaniga, 2004; Doesburg et al., 2009), and (b) uncovering the
unconscious processes preceding a conscious percept (Di Lollo
et al., 2000; Goodhew et al., 2012; see Fischer et al., 2013).
Such research has also led to the integration consensus (Tononi
and Edelman, 1988; Baars, 1988, 1998, 2005, 2013; Damasio,
1989; Freeman, 1991; Srinivasan et al., 1999; Zeki and Bartels,
1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Llinás and Ribary, 2001; Varela et al., 2001; Clark, 2002; Ortinski
and Meador, 2004; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Morsella, 2005;
Del Cul et al., 2007; Kriegel, 2007; Merker, 2007; Doesburg et al.,
2009; Uhlhaas et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2011; Koch, 2012; Tallon-
Baudry, 2012; Tononi, 2012), which proposes that consciousness
integrates neural activities and information-processing structures
that would otherwise be independent (see reviews in Baars, 2002;
see Morsella, 2005, for the limitations of the integration consen-
sus and for a listing of integrations that can occur unconsciously).
Findings from action-based research complement the integra-
tion consensus: Consistent with the integration consensus, in
conditions in which actions are decoupled from consciousness
(e.g., in neurological disorders), actions often appear impulsive
or inappropriate, as if they are not adequately influenced by
the kinds of information by which they should be influenced
(Morsella and Bargh, 2011). These actions reveal a lack of ade-
quate integration. Thus, consciousness appears to permit a form
of integration that constrains potential action, achieving a form
ofmultiple-constraint satisfaction (Merker, 2013). Constraints can
be “online,” reflecting stimuli in the current environment, or they
can be “offline,” reflecting covert processes such as memory, cog-
nitive maps, operations on mental representations, and mental
simulation (Schacter and Addis, 2007). For example, recent the-
ories propose that the function of explicit, episodic memory—a
form of knowledge representation intimately associated with the
past—is actually to simulate future, potential actions (Schacter
and Addis, 2007).
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTION
Although theorists have long appreciated that consciousness
is intimately related to action (James, 1890; Neumann, 1987;
Allport, 1989; Hamker, 2003; Morsella, 2005; Baddeley, 2007),
until recently there has been a substantial gap in our knowl-
edge regarding how action-related processes influence conscious-
ness. The reason for this gap is not surprising, as action itself
is an under-explored topic of research (see reasons for this in
Nattkemper and Ziessler, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2005; Agnew et al.,
2009; Herwig et al., 2013). Action control is a highly complicated
process, one involving various kinds of mechanisms (e.g., hier-
archical vs. distributed control and forward modeling vs. inverse
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modeling; Arkin, 1998; Miall, 2003). See in this issue, the arti-
cle by Jordan. Only recently have researchers begun to focus on
the action-related aspects of consciousness (e.g., Frith et al., 2000;
Lau et al., 2004; Libet, 2004; Morsella, 2005; Berti and Pia, 2006;
Jeannerod, 2006; Pacherie, 2008; Morsella and Bargh, 2010).
The following sections summarize those findings from action-
based research that are relevant to this special issue about con-
sciousness and action control (for a review of all action research,
see Morsella, 2009)3.
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING IN ACTION CONTROL
Investigations on consciousness and action control have revealed
that many sophisticated aspects of action production can or do
occur unconsciously (Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Morsella and
Bargh, 2011; see Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2013). Specifically,
investigations from diverse areas (see review in Morsella and
Bargh, 2011), including motor control (Rosenbaum, 2002), sub-
liminal processing (Hallett, 2007), automatisms (Morsella and
Bargh, 2011), dissociations between action and conscious percep-
tion (Goodale and Milner, 2004), and the automatic activation
of action plans (Morsella and Miozzo, 2002; Ellis, 2009), reveal
that the activation, modulation, selection, and, in some cases,
expression of action plans can occur unconsciously. For example,
research on various neurological conditions has revealed aspects
of action control that can occur unconsciously. These neurologi-
cal conditions include blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1992, 1997), blind
smell (Sobel et al., 1999), utilization behavior (Lhermitte, 1983),
visual form agnosia (e.g., Patient D. F.; Milner and Goodale, 1995),
anarchic hand syndrome (Marchetti and Della Sala, 1998), sen-
sory neglect (Graziano, 2001; Heilman et al., 2003), unintentional
ambient echolalia (Suzuki et al., 2012), and complex automa-
tisms, (e.g., vocalizations and singing) during epileptic seizures
(Blanken et al., 1990; Enatsu et al., 2011; Kececi et al., 2013).
Insights about consciousness and action control stemmed also
from the study of the “split brain” patient (Sperry, 1961), and
from conditions in which declarative memory is compromised
but action programs can be stored and influence action even
when the patient is unaware of the acquisition or maintenance
of these programs (e.g., as in the case of H. M.; Milner, 1966).
Together, this research provided substantial knowledge about the
sophisticated capacities of unconscious processing in action con-
trol (see, in this issue, contributions by Cruse and Schilling, by
Fischer et al., by Hommel, by Masicampo and Baumeister, by
Panagiotaropoulos et al., and by Merker).
This research also reveals which aspects of action control may
be unconscious during normal, everyday action, in which con-
scious and unconscious processes interact in ways that are only
now beginning to be understood (see, in this issue, articles by
Lynn et al., by Panagiotaropoulos et al., and by Merker). For
instance, under normal circumstances, a person is unconscious
of the complicated motor programs that, during action pro-
duction, calculate which muscles should be activated at a given
time (James, 1890; Rosenbaum, 2002; Johnson and Haggard,
2005; see Grossberg, 1999, about why motor programs must be
3The following is based in part on reviews of the literature presented in
Morsella and Bargh (2011); Morsella et al. (2011) and Hubbard et al. (2013).
unconscious). Specifically, evidence suggests that one is uncon-
scious of the programming of the efference to the muscles as
well as of the adjustments that are made “online” as one, say,
reaches for a moving object (Fecteau et al., 2001; Rossetti, 2001;
Rosenbaum, 2002; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Heath et al., 2008;
Liu et al., 2008; see, in this issue, articles by Anderson et al. and by
Rosenbaum et al.).
The activation of action plans (a phenomenon to be dis-
tinguished from motor control) can occur unintentionally (see
Lynn et al., this issue). This has been revealed in experimental
paradigms in which themere presence of incidental action-related
stimuli can interfere with one’s intended response to a target
stimulus. A basic form of this effect has been demonstrated for
decades in the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; see reviews
in MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988; MacLeod, 1991; MacLeod and
MacDonald, 2000), in which the mere presence of a word (e.g.,
RED) interferes with naming a patch of color (e.g., blue). In this
task, participants are instructed to name the color in which a
word is written. When the color matches the word (e.g., RED
presented in red), or is presented on a neutral stimulus (e.g., a
series of x’s as in XXXX), there is little or no interference [e.g.,
decreased response times (RTs)] and decreased perturbations in
consciousness (e.g., “urges to make a mistake”; Morsella et al.,
2009a). (Urges to err, a subjective effect, are obtained simply by
asking participants after each trial, “How strong was your urge
to make a mistake?” which participants rate on an 8-point scale,
in which 1 signifies “almost no urge” and 8 signifies “extremely
strong urge.”) When the word and color are incongruous (e.g.,
RED presented in blue), response conflict leads to interference
(Cohen et al., 1990), including increased RTs, error rates, and sys-
tematic changes in consciousness, such as urges to err (Morsella
et al., 2009a).
In the incongruent condition, set-related top-down activa-
tion from prefrontal cortex increases the activation of areas in
posterior brain regions (e.g., visual association cortex) that are
associated with task-relevant dimensions (e.g., color; Enger and
Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley et al., 2005). Thus, to influence behavior,
action sets from information in working memory or long-term
memory increase or decrease the strength of perceptuosemantic
information, along with, most likely, other kinds of informa-
tion (e.g., motor priming). The finding that top-down activation
strengthens one representation (e.g., color-naming) over another
(e.g., word-reading) can be characterized as a case of “refresh-
ing,” the act of foregrounding one representation over another
(Johnson and Johnson, 2009). Following an incongruent trial,
ramped up activation in control regions of the brain (e.g., the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex) leads to improved performance on the
subsequent trial (Cohen et al., 1990).
PARADIGMS ILLUMINATING THE LIAISON BETWEEN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTION CONTROL
The Stroop task is one of many response interference paradigms
(see, in this issue, articles by Anguera et al. and by Lynn et al.).
In such paradigms, subjects attempt to respond to a target (e.g.,
font color in the Stroop task) while presented with a distractor
(e.g., Stroop word). Such interference paradigms have revealed
much about the role of consciousness in action control. Findings
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complementing that of the Stroop paradigm have been obtained
with the classic Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974).
In one version of the task (Eriksen and Schultz, 1979), partic-
ipants are trained to press one button with one finger when
presented with the letter S or M and to press another button with
another finger when presented with the letter P or H. After train-
ing, participants are then instructed to respond to the stimulus
presented in the center of an array (e.g., SSPSS, SSMSS, targets
underscored) and to disregard the “flanking” distractors (i.e., the
Ss). Of all the flanker conditions, measures of interference such
as RTs, error rates, and self-reported urges to err are lowest in
the Identical condition, where flankers and targets are identical,
as in SSSSS (Eriksen and Schultz, 1979; Morsella et al., 2009b).
In this paradigm, it is well-established that interference is greater
when distractors are associated with a response that is different
from that of the target (response interference; e.g., SSPSS) than
when distractors look different from targets but are associated
with the same response (perceptual interference; e.g., SSMSS; van
Veen et al., 2001; Morsella et al., 2009b). These findings, reveal-
ing that perceptual processes can automatically activate action
plans, have been used as evidence for continuous flow (Eriksen
and Schultz, 1979) and cascade (McClelland, 1979; Navarrete and
Costa, 2004) models of perception-and-action (see discussion in
Morsella, 2009; see, in this issue, Filevich andHaggard’s treatment
of the effects of unselected actions).
There are many other experimental paradigms that illuminate
the study of consciousness and action control: the anti-saccade
task (Hallett, 1978; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2009), the MacLeod
and Dunbar object naming task (MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988),
spatial compatibility tasks (e.g., the Simon task; Simon et al.,
1970), response-effect compatibility paradigms (Kunde, 2001),
the Posner attentional cuing task (1980), dual-task paradigms
(Kahneman, 1973; Logan and Gordon, 2001), binocular rivalry
(Alais and Blake, 2005), inattentional blindness (Raymond et al.,
1992), covert priming paradigms (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000),
the implicit association task (Greenwald et al., 1998), and the
go/no go (Newman et al., 1985) and stop-signal tasks (Lappin and
Eriksen, 1966; see, in this issue, articles by Anguera et al. and by
Diefenbach et al.).
Evidence from these paradigms suggests that response interfer-
ence stems from the automatic, “stimulus-triggered” activation of
action plans (DeSoto et al., 2001), as if distractors automatically
activate the associated action plans. Accordingly, psychophysio-
logical research shows that, in response interference, competition
involves simultaneous activation of the brain areas associated
with the target- and distractor-related responses (DeSoto et al.,
2001;Mattler, 2005). Complementary evidence has been obtained
from a more micro level of analysis: The activity of the neurons
in the motor cortex that, in the aggregate, yield a population code
corresponding to one vs. another action (e.g., moving the arm
left or right; Georgopoulos et al., 1983; Bagrat and Georgopoulos,
1999). This research reveals that individual neurons can be
found to fire, not only for the target-related action (i.e., the
intended actions), but also for distractor-related actions (Cisek
and Kalaska, 2005). Interestingly, although neurons actively code
distractor-related action plans, this activation does not appear
to influence one’s conscious awareness about ongoing action:
One infers only that one’s whole brain and musculature were
concerned about executing the intended movement (see, in this
issue, article by Filevich and Haggard). Research on automatic-
ity (Puttemans et al., 2005) and on the consciously inaccessible
neural mechanisms underlying action intentions (Libet, 2004)
similarly reveal several sophisticated action-related processes that
are unconscious.
Similarly, research on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 2008)
has revealed that, when observing the actions of others, one is
activating neural circuits that correspond to action planning, even
though one may be motionless and utterly unconscious of these
activations. This research also reveals that conscious percepts are
intimately related to action control (James, 1890; Gibson, 1979;
Llinás, 2002; Fuster, 2003). For example, Proffitt and colleagues
(Proffitt et al., 2003; Witt et al., 2005) have shown that hills
look steeper if one is carrying a heavy backpack or that objects
appear closer when one is holding a tool that makes it easier to
retrieve those objects (see also Firestone, 2013; Proffitt, 2013).
For evidence regarding the role of functional knowledge in object
identification, see Bub et al. (2003).
Additional evidence for unconsciously mediated action-
related processing stems from the study of efference binding
(Haggard et al., 2002a), which links perceptual processing to
action/motor processing. This kind of stimulus-response bind-
ing allows one to learn to press a button when presented with a
cue in a laboratory paradigm. Taylor andMcCloskey (1990, 1996)
demonstrated that, in a choice RT task, participants could select
the correct motor response (one of two button presses) when con-
fronted with subliminal stimuli (cf., Hallett, 2007). Unconscious
efference binding also occurs in the case of reflexive responses
to environmental stimuli, as in the pain withdrawal reflex. It is
worth mentioning that, concerning unconscious integrations, the
binding of perceptual information, known as afference binding
(Morsella and Bargh, 2011) can also occur unconsciously, as is
evident in intra- and inter-sensory illusions (e.g., the McGurk
effect; McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). (The McGurk effect
involves interactions between visual and auditory processes: An
observer views a speaker mouthing “ga” while presented with
the sound “ba.” Surprisingly, the observer is unaware of any
intersensory interaction, perceiving only “da.”)
CONSCIOUS ASPECTS OF ACTION CONTROL
An appreciation of all that can transpire unconsciously during
action control leads one to the following question. If so much
in action control can be accomplished unconsciously, then what
does consciousness contribute to action control? How and why is
consciousness associated with some aspects of action control but
not others?
When attempting to answer this question, one must con-
sider that some aspects of action control do perturb conscious-
ness strongly and reliably: (a) action-related mental imagery, (b)
senses such as the sense of agency and sense of effort, and (c) action-
related urges (e.g., arising under conditions of action conflict).
We now discuss these under-explored conscious aspects of action
control.
It has been demonstrated that the simultaneous activation of
incompatible skeletomotor action plans, as when holding one’s
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breath while underwater (where one is inclined to both inhale
and not inhale) or suppressing a prepotent response in a response
interference paradigm (see, in this issue, articles by Anguera et al.,
and by Lynn et al.), reliably influence consciousness (see quanti-
tative review of evidence in Morsella et al., 2011). During such
conscious conflicts (Morsella, 2005), a person experiences notable
subjective “tuggings and pullings.” Lewin (1935), Freud (1938),
and Miller (1959) studied the nature of these intra-psychic con-
flicts. Often, in such conflicts, the expression of undesired action
plans can be suppressed, but the subjectively experienced action-
related inclinations cannot be (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). For
instance, a person can suppress dropping a painfully hot dish of
porcelain, but cannot suppress the subjective urges to drop the
expensive dish (Morsella, 2005). In this way, inclinations can be
behaviorally suppressed but most often cannot be mentally sup-
pressed (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). These conscious conflicts
stand in contrast to (a) conflicts involving smooth muscle (e.g.,
involving the pupillary reflex; cf., Morsella et al., 2009a), and (b)
perceptual conflicts, which tend to be unconscious, as in the case
of ventriloquism and McGurk effects (McGurk and MacDonald,
1976). This pattern of results suggests that the skeletal mus-
cle system (an effector given the special appellation, “voluntary
muscle”) is intimately associated with conscious processing (see
explanation in Morsella, 2005).
It should be noted that the interference paradigms mentioned
above involve only punctate acts that are executed quickly (color
naming and button pressing), placingminimal demands onwork-
ing memory (WM). (See, in this issue, article by Anguera et al.
and by Buchsbaum.) (WM has been defined as a temporary,
capacity-limited storage system under attentional control that is
used to intentionally hold, and manipulate, information in mind;
Baddeley, 1986, 2007.) However, many of the conscious con-
flicts of everyday life—holding one’s breath or gargling strong
mouthwash for 30 sec—are not fleeting, short-lived events, but
events that unfold over time and make demands on WM, by
requiring one to hold in mind an action goal (e.g., not expelling
mouthwash before 30 sec; Hommel and Elsner, 2009). In everyday
life, many goal-directed actions are also guided by representa-
tions that are not triggered by external stimuli (Miller et al.,
1960; Neisser, 1967). (This also occurs in the phenomenon of
prospective memory; see McDaniel and Einstein, 2007.) Sustaining
the activation of such internally-generated representations is an
effortful process, requiring that top-down activation strengthen
one representation (e.g., the target or action goal) over another
(e.g., task-irrelevant goals; Gazzaley et al., 2005). Thus, many
everyday acts of action control are actually instances of WM-
based action control, in which a person effortfully holds an
action goal in mind while attempting to overcome goal-irrelevant
interference.
Theoretical developments have forwarded the notion thatWM
is intimately related to both action control and consciousness
(LeDoux, 2008). This is evident in the title and contents of a
recent treatise, Working Memory, Thought, and Action (Baddeley,
2007). Indeed, perhaps no mental operation is as consistently
coupled with consciousness as is WM (LeDoux, 2008). When
trying to hold inmind action-related information, a person’s con-
sciousness is consumed by this goal (James, 1890). For instance,
when holding a to-be-dialed telephone number in mind (or
when gargling with mouthwash for 30 sec), action-related mental
imagery occupies one’s consciousness during the delayed action
phase. Similarly, before making an important toast (or, more
dramatically, making the toast in a foreign and unmastered lan-
guage), a person has conscious imagery regarding the words
to be uttered, much as when an actor rehearses lines for an
upcoming scene (see, in this issue, article by Buchsbaum). In
this way, before an act, the mind is occupied with perceptual-
like representations of what that act is to be, as James (1890)
stated: “In perfectly simple voluntary acts there is nothing else
in the mind but the kinesthetic idea. . . of what the act is to be”
(p. 771). Thus, voluntary action control often occupies both WM
and consciousness. Common experience suggests that, during
the delay before action production, action-related imagery enters
one’s consciousness. The imagery is isomorphic in some ways
with the overt action goal, especially in the case of “subvocal-
ization” (Morsella and Bargh, 2010), which involves “talking in
one’s head” (Levelt, 1989). In subvocalizing, auditory imagery
is isomorphic in some way with what would be uttered (Levelt,
1989; Baddeley, 2007; Morsella et al., 2009b; Morsella and Bargh,
2010).
In addition to conscious conflicts, urges, andWM-related con-
scious imagery is the sense of agency, another conscious aspect of
action control. The sense of agency is based on the perception of
the lawful correspondence between action intentions and action
outcomes (Haggard and Clark, 2003; Wegner, 2003; Hommel,
2009). For example, if one has the intention of flexing one’s finger
or of saying “hello” and then one’s finger happens to flex or one
hears oneself utter “hello,” respectively, then one is likely to sense
that one caused the action. This attribution is the outcome of
conceptual processing (Synofzik et al., 2008a,b; Jeannerod, 2009)
that takes into account information from various contextual fac-
tors (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Moore et al., 2009), including
that of motor efference (Cole, 2007; Engbert et al., 2007; Tsakiris
et al., 2007; Sato, 2009), proprioception (Balslev et al., 2007;
Knoblich and Repp, 2009), and the perception of the real-world
consequences of action intentions (Synofzik et al., 2009). This
sense could be considered a form ofmetacognition (Dunlosky and
Metcalfe, 2008).
Bymanipulating contextual factors, scores of experiments have
demonstrated that subjects can be fooled into believing that
they caused actions that were in fact caused by something else
(Wegner, 2002). For example, when a participant’s hand con-
trols a computer-drawing device behind a screen such that the
participant cannot see his or her hand in motion, the partic-
ipant can be fooled into thinking (through false feedback on
the computer display) that the hand intentionally moved in one
direction when it actually moved in a slightly different direction
(Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). With such techniques, partici-
pants in another study were tricked into believing that they could
control the movements of stimuli on a computer screen through a
phony brain-computer interface (Lynn et al., 2010). When inten-
tions and outcomes mismatch, people are less likely to perceive
actions as originating from the self (Wegner, 2002).
Most of these studies examine how agency is influenced by
intention-outcome mismatches or illusory intention-outcome
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matches. There are several “comparator models” explaining
how intention-outcome mismatches are detected and influence
various levels of agency. Importantly, different theorists link the
sense of agency and urges to different phases of the process (cf.,
Haggard, 2005, 2008; Berti and Pia, 2006; David et al., 2008).
Complementing research on the sense of agency are investigations
on the sense of effort during action control (Sherrington, 1900,
1906; Gandevia, 1982) and the sense of body ownership (e.g.,
in the rubber hand illusion; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and of
actions generated toward the body (e.g., tickling-related illusions;
Blakemore et al., 2000). Additionally, states described as flow
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) and effortless attention (Bruya, 2010)
have been associated with forms of action control. Moreover,
theorists of the Würzburg School (e.g., Külpe, Ach, and Marbe)
have discussed several, action-related conscious attitudes, includ-
ing doubt, hesitation, certainty, and will to enact a certain change
in the world.
We will now survey some less intuitive properties of action-
related conscious processing. First, there is a peculiar property
of voluntary action that appears to not be shared by other (e.g.,
involuntary) forms of action. For reasons unknown, in intentional
binding, the perceived elapsed time between a voluntary action
and its consequence is shorter than the actual time span (Haggard
et al., 2002b), as if the two events were temporally attracted to
each other. Thus, when striking a bell voluntarily, the experiences
of striking the bell and of hearing the gong of the bell are per-
ceived to occur more closely together in time than they actually
did.
Another property of action-related consciousness arises in the
paradigm of binocular rivalry (see Logothetis article). In this
paradigm (see review in Alais and Blake, 2005), participants are
first trained to respond in certain ways when presented with
visual stimuli (e.g., to button-press when presented with the
image of a house). After training, a different stimulus is pre-
sented to each eye (e.g., an image of a house to one eye and of
a tree to the other). Surprisingly, the participant does not con-
sciously perceive both objects (e.g., a tree overlapping a house),
but responds as if perceiving only one object at a time (e.g., a
house followed by a tree). During rivalry, the conscious percept
is said to be “dominant,” and the unconscious percept is said to
be “suppressed.”
The mind’s process of switching dominance between each eye
can be manipulated in interesting ways. Maruya et al. (2007)
demonstrated that voluntary action can influence which percept
enters awareness: The object thatmoved in synchrony with partic-
ipants’ voluntary movements of a computer mouse was dominant
for a longer period of time and suppressed for a shorter period
of time. Rivalry stimuli consisted of a radial grating (resembling
the pattern on a dart board) and a rotating sphere that was
transparent and defined solely by dots. Prior to test, participants
learned to move a computer mouse in a continuous left-to-right
motion. Participants later performed this motion under condi-
tions of rivalry. Maruya et al. (2007) concluded, “conflict between
two incompatible visual stimuli tends to be resolved in favor of
a stimulus that is under motor control of the observer view-
ing that stimulus” (p. 1096), revealing “a strong link between
action and perception” (p. 1090). This finding is consistent with
that of Wohlschläger (2000), who reported that, while perceiving
a perceptually bistable apparent rotation of an object, partici-
pants were more likely to perceive the object as rotating in the
direction in which they happened to be rotating a knob (Repp and
Knoblich, 2007), a case of perceptual resonance (Wohlschläger,
2000; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). Consistent with the find-
ing byMaruya et al. (2007), Doesburg et al. (2009) found in a psy-
chophysiological study that it is only during the dominant percept
that perceptual processing associated with the percept is coupled
with motor-related processes in frontal cortex. (Additional evi-
dence stems from a recent study showing that entry of any kind
may require a top-down signal from frontal cortex; Boly et al.,
2011; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012.)
Perceptual resonance, and the voluntary control of action, can
be explained by ideomotor theory (Lotze, 1852; Harleß, 1861;
James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel,
2009; Hommel and Elsner, 2009). When popularizing this theory,
William James (1890) proposed that the mere thoughts of actions
produce impulses that, if not curbed or controlled by thoughts of
incompatible actions, result in the performance of the imagined
actions (see Marien et al., this issue). From this view, activat-
ing the perceptual effects of an action leads to the corresponding
action—effortlessly and without awareness of the motor pro-
grams involved (Gray, 1995; Kunde, 2004). The representations
guiding action production tend to be perceptual-like images of
action outcomes (Hommel, 2009), which are based on memo-
ries of prior action outcomes (see, in this issue, Marien et al. for
role of reward in ideomotor learning). Consistent with ideomo-
tor theory, during conflicts such as those of the Stroop task, it is
perceptual-like representations that are activated to guide action
(Enger and Hirsch, 2005).
Because action/motor processes are largely unconscious
(Grossberg, 1999; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Gray, 2004), the
entry into consciousness of content is influenced most by
perceptual-based (and not action-based) events and processes
(e.g., priming by perceptual representations; Müller, 1843; James,
1890; Gray, 2004; Morsella and Bargh, 2010). [See brain stim-
ulation evidence in Desmurget et al. (2009).] Hence, few con-
scious contents should arise from what can be construed as
“pure” action-related processes (should there be such a thing;
cf., Hommel, 2009). Thus, entry from action in Maruya et al.
(2007) might be the result of the more “perceptual” aspects of
action production, such as perceptual-like action effect represen-
tations (or “Effektbild”; Harleß, 1861) or corollary discharges
from action plans (Gray, 2004). From this standpoint, though
perception and action are intimately related and may even share
the same representational format, as in “common code” mod-
els of perception-and-action (Hommel, 2009), when it comes
to phenomenology, consciousness is most influenced by what
has traditionally been regarded as the perceptual end of the
perception-action cycle (Neisser, 1976; Gray, 1995). Accordingly,
research by Wohlschläger (2000) and by ideomotor theorists
(e.g., Hommel, 2009) suggests that action-based effects on aware-
ness such as perceptual resonance require, not only perturbation
of the sensorium, but dimensional overlap (e.g., shared spatial
dimensions) between actions and percepts (cf., Knuf et al., 2001;
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
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As noted, some ideomotor models propose that perceptual
action effects and action codes share the same representational
format, hence the description of some ideomotor accounts
as common code theories of perception-and-action (Hommel,
2009). Such common code perspectives resemble mirror neu-
ron approaches (Rizzolatti et al., 2008) and motor theories of
speech perception (Liberman and Mattingly, 1985). (For a treat-
ment of action simulation, see, in this issue, Springer et al.)
Similarly, speaking about the interconnection between percep-
tion and action, Sperry (1952) proposed that the phenomenal
percept (e.g., the shape of a banana) is more isomorphic with
its related action plans (grabbing or drawing the banana) than
with its sensory input (the proximal stimulus on the retina). [For
contemporary treatments regarding how action influences the
nature of conscious percepts, see Gray (1995), Hochberg (1998),
O’Regan and Noë (2001), and Humphreys (2013).]
With great influence, Gibson (1979) too proposed an “eco-
logical theory” of perception in which perception is intimately
related to action, but, unlike ideomotor theory and common code
approaches, Gibson’s approach is strictly non-representational
in that all the information necessary for action was provided
and contained by the environment. For a treatment regarding
the difference between ecological and representational (“cogni-
tive”) theories of action, see Hommel et al. (2001). See Sheerer
(1984) and Markman (1999) for reviews of the shortcomings
of approaches in which the nature of percepts or, more gener-
ally, representations, is constituted in part by motor processing,
as in “peripheralist,” “motor,” “embodied,” “efferent,” and “reaf-
ferent” theories of thought (e.g., Münsterberg, 1891; Watson,
1924; Washburn, 1928; Held and Rekosh, 1963; McGuigan, 1966;
Festinger et al., 1967; Hebb, 1968; see discussion of embodied
approaches in Deifenbach et al., this issue; see relevant article by
Jordan, in this issue).
CONCLUSION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE ON
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTION CONTROL
Our survey and the following articles reveal that one of the pri-
mary reasons to study consciousness by way of action control
is that the contrast between conscious and unconscious pro-
cesses is easy to appreciate from an action-based standpoint.
It is important to consider that, though it is far from trivial
to demonstrate unconscious perceptual processing—a contro-
versial phenomenon whose study often requires neuroimaging
and sophisticated techniques (e.g., perceptual priming)—even
the most cursory examination of action phenomena reveals that,
in the nervous system, there is the distinction of processes that
are consciously mediated (e.g., voluntary action) and unconsciously
mediated (e.g., reflexes, peristalsis, and aspects of motor control).
Stumbling upon this contrast between conscious and uncon-
scious processes is not only uncontroversial in the study of action
but is inevitable. In addition, it is more experimentally tractable to
study the relationship between action and consciousness than that
between attention and consciousness (the traditional approach;
cf., Baars, 1997), because in the former there is less likelihood
of conflating conscious and attentional processes (cf., Hamker,
2003), a recurring problem in consciousness research (Baars,
1997; Maruya et al., 2007). Last, what Sperry noted in 1952 about
action is still true: The outputs of a system reveal more about
the inner workings of the system than do the inputs to the sys-
tem. As the cardinal “output” of the nervous system (Morsella
and Bargh, 2010), action thus provides the investigator with a
unique portal to illuminate the most elusive of central processes,
consciousness.
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